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The Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws  
on Teenage Marriage and Births in Turkey
* 
 
This paper estimates the impact of the extension of compulsory schooling in Turkey from 5 to 
8 years on the marriage and fertility behavior of teenage women in Turkey using the 2008 
Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. We find that the new education policy reduces the 
probability of marriage and giving birth for teenage women substantially: the probability of 
marriage by age 16 is reduced by 44 percent and the probability of giving birth by age 17 falls 
by 36 percent. The effects of the education policy on the time until marriage and first-birth 
persist beyond the completion of compulsory schooling. In addition, we find that the delay in 
the time until first-birth is driven by the delay in the time until marriage. After a woman is 
married, the rise in compulsory schooling years does not have an effect on the duration until 
her first-birth. Finally, we find that the education policy was more effective in reducing early 
marriage than a change in the Civil Code aimed for this purpose. 
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1.  Introduction  
Adolescent fertility continues to receive wide attention in the literature. The negative 
association between teenage motherhood and women’s education and labor market outcomes 
as well as their children’s health status (e.g. birth weight, higher infant mortality) and teenage 
mother’s higher welfare dependency and involvement in crime have been well documented. 
Recent  studies,  however, questioned some  of the early associations  and embarked  on an 
effort to determine whether a causal relation exists between adolescent fertility and these 
outcomes. Klepinger et al. (1999), Chevalier and Viitanen (2003), and Fletcher and Wolfe 
(2009) find that teenage motherhood reduces schooling, work experience and market wages.
1 
Levine and Painter (2003) as well as Holmlund (2005) also confirm that teen-childbearing 
reduces  education  substantially.  Webbink  et  al.  (2008)  find  that  teenage  motherhood 
increases smoking and the probability of being overweight. On the other hand, studies that 
investigate  the causal  relationship  between  adolescent  fertility  and  child  health  outcomes 
have  arrived  at  mixed  results  (Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin,  1995;  Wolpin,  1997). 
Intergenerational effects of early childbearing are also reported. Francesconi (2008) finds that 
children of teenage mothers have lower educational attainment, lower earnings and greater 
risks of inactivity and teenage childbearing. Hunt (2006) confirms that teenage mothers are 
more likely to engage in crime. At the macroeconomic level, Đyigün (2000) shows that early 
childbearing may lead to a development trap with low human capital. 
Education affects fertility through a number of channels.
2 Education provides better 
knowledge of contraceptive methods, which have been shown to be effective in reducing 
                                                
1 An exception is Hotz et al. (2005), who in fact find positive effects on annual hours of work 
and earnings.  
2 In his study on low-income countries, Schultz (1994a) estimates that an additional year of 
schooling for women is associated with a 12 percent decline in total fertility. Glewwe (2002) 
reviews the literature on the relationship between schooling and marriage and fertility in 
developing countries.   4 
fertility (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985, 1989). Higher opportunity cost of raising children 
(Becker, 1991), lower infant mortality rates–which lowers the number of births needed to 
reach  the  desired  family  size–(Schultz,  1994b),  and  higher  bargaining  power  in  fertility 
decisions for more educated women (Mason, 1986) are the other possible channels through 
which education influences fertility decisions. 
In  socially  conservative  countries,  where  giving  birth  out-of-wedlock  is  socially 
condemned and therefore is rare, mandating teens to stay in school for longer years is a 
potentially important intervention on childbearing because longer schooling delays the time 
at which girls enter the marriage market. A delay in the entry to the marriage market implies 
an automatic delay in childbearing in these countries. In fact, an important characteristic of 
the transition into motherhood of women in Turkey is that almost all are married at the time 
of  birth.  The  sociology  literature  reports  a  rigid  sequence  of  events  of  completion  of 
education, marriage, and, birth of the first child in other countries as well (Blossfeld and De 
Rose, 1992; Marini, 1984). A key fact here is that in this sequence of events, the gap between 
the age at marriage and first-birth is quite narrow in Turkey. The lapse of time between 
marriage and first-birth is on average 1.6 years. Given this narrow gap between the timing of 
marriage and first-birth and the fact that marriage and schooling are generally incompatible 
events, a change in the timing of marriage as a result of increased schooling would directly 
translate into a change in the timing of early fertility as well.  
In Turkey, the compulsory schooling duration was extended from 5 to 8 years in 
1997. In this study, we estimate the causal impact of the new compulsory schooling policy on 
the timing of marriage and first-birth decisions of teenage women in Turkey. We exploit the 
variation in the exposure to the policy across different birth-cohorts to find this causal impact. 
The data set we use for this purpose is the 2008 wave of the Turkish Demographic and Health   5 
Survey, which is representative nationally and contains detailed information on transitions to 
marriage and fertility. 
Our results indicate that the extension  of compulsory schooling in Turkey indeed 
reduced  the  probability  of  marriage  and  giving  birth  for  teenage  women.  What  is  more 
interesting is that the impact of the extension of compulsory schooling persists beyond the 
completion of compulsory schooling. We find that the percentage of married women at age 
16 drops by 45 percent, and the percentage of women who give birth by age 17, roughly three 
years after the end of compulsory schooling, goes down by 36 percent as a result of the 
policy. 
That the effect of the policy persists well beyond the end of compulsory schooling 
suggests that there is a human capital effect of increased compulsory schooling in addition to 
its incarceration effect. However, another important finding of our study is that the fall in 
early fertility as a result of increased schooling is driven by the delay in the age at marriage; 
once a woman is married, we find no evidence of a delaying effect of the policy on the time 
to  first-birth.  Therefore,  any  human  capital  effect  of  increased  compulsory  schooling  is 
certainly limited to the marriage market; the human capital effect plays no role in the time to 
first-birth after marriage. 
Finally, this study also examines the impact of the change in the Civil Code in 2002, 
which raised the minimum age for marriage, along with the impact of the education policy on 
teenage marriage. The change in the Civil Code is not found to affect the timing of marriage. 
In other words, the education policy worked better in reducing teenage marriage and fertility 
than a change in the Civil Code aimed for this purpose. 
The  outline  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  briefly  provides  background 
information on marriage and fertility behavior as well as the education system in Turkey. 
Section 3 discusses the methodology and the identification strategy used in the paper. Section   6 
4 presents the results. Section 5 includes  a discussion of our major findings and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2.  Background Information 
2.1. Relevant Literature 
In the empirical literature, most of the studies do not go beyond establishing a positive 
association between education and age at marriage as well as first-birth
3 due mainly to the 
difficulty  of  controlling  for  unobservable  factors  that  affect  both  schooling  and  age  at 
marriage  and  first-birth.
4  For  instance,  if  individuals  who  have  a  strong  preference  for 
schooling also have strong preference to marry late, a positive association between schooling 
and age at marriage will be observed. Failing to control for such unobservable factors would 
therefore result in an erroneous conclusion that schooling delays the age at marriage. To 
overcome  this  endogeneity  problem  in  the  schooling  variable,  an  exogenous  variation  in 
schooling is needed. 
This exogenous variation in schooling generally comes from natural experiments in 
the literature. However, due to the difficulty in finding natural experiments, such studies—
that can handle the endogeneity of schooling—are relatively few (e.g. Brien and Lillard, 
1994; Skirbekk et al., 2004; Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Osili and Long, 2007; Black et al, 
2008; Monstand et al, 2008). These papers, except for Brien and Lillard (1994), overcome the 
endogeneity problem by using natural experiments as we do. 
                                                
3 For instance, see Tawiah (1984) for Ghana, Sathar et al. (1988) for Pakistan, Blossfeld and 
Huinink (1991) for West Germany, Santow and Bracher (1994) for Australia, and Raymo 
(2003) for Japan.  
4 The simultaneous rise in women’s schooling and the fall in marriage rates in the West have 
spurred a theoretical interest on the reasons for the association between the two phenomena. 
The prominent theories in this areas are the marriage model of Becker (1973, 1991) and the 
search model of Oppenheimer (1988).   7 
Among those studies, only Black et al. (2008) concentrate on teenage fertility. In fact, 
Black et al. (2008) also estimate the causal impact of changes in compulsory schooling laws 
on teenage births. However, there are significant contextual differences in the teenage fertility 
setting of Black et al.—Norway and the U.S.—and ours. First of all, in Turkey marriage is 
virtually a necessary condition for teenage fertility (which is explained in more detail in the 
next section); therefore, unlike Black et al., we study the transition to marriage along with the 
transition to motherhood. Due to the same reason, the channels through which compulsory 
schooling affects teenage births are very different from those in the U.S. or Norway. In fact, 
we examine whether any change in the time to first-birth is caused by a change in the time to 
marriage or in the time until first-birth after marriage. In addition, the fact that a significant 
fraction of girls get married as a teenager–more than 22 percent of the 19-year-old women in 
2008  were  married–and  most  give  birth  soon  afterwards  in  Turkey  make  it  an excellent 
setting to study the impact of schooling on teenage marriage and fertility. 
Another  important  distinguishing  characteristic  of  our  study  from  Black  et  al. 
(2004)—as well as from the natural experiments studies in this literature in general—is the 
strength of the exogenous variation in schooling due to the long duration of the extension of 
compulsory schooling in Turkey—three extra years—and the high percentage of students 
whose behavior was actually affected. Monstad et al. (2008) report that the birth-cohorts who 
were affected by the extension of compulsory schooling in Norway by two years in 1959—
which is also the policy used by Black et al. (2008)—and who were roughly 5 years younger 
than the control group had 0.5 years of more education. On the other hand, in our study, the 
difference in years of schooling is more than a year between the 1986-1990 birth cohorts—
who are affected by the policy—and the 1981-1985 birth cohorts—who are not affected by 
the policy (despite the fact that the schooling level of the former group is more likely to be 
incomplete in 2008).   8 
Finally, the estimated magnitudes of the policy change in our study are much larger 
than those in Black et al. (2008). For instance, one of the largest effect they find is that the 
policy of mandating women to stay in school until age 17 reduces the probability of birth by 
age 19 by 8.8 percent in the U.S..
5 On the other hand, we find that the policy change in 
Turkey reduced the probability of giving birth by age 17 by 36 percent. 
2.2. Background Information on Marriage, Fertility, and Education in Turkey 
Despite the rise in non-marital unions in the West, marriage as a social institution 
remains strong in Turkey. Almost 98 percent of women marry by age 49. In contrast, divorce 
is an unlikely event, with its rate estimated at less than 1 percent among 15-49 year-old 
women.  Hence,  it  would  not  be  incorrect  to  say  that  for  an  average  woman  in  Turkey 
marriage is for life. Giving birth out-of-wedlock is even rarer than choosing an alternative 
living arrangement. According to DHS data, almost all births are to a married woman. Age at 
first-birth is also closely linked to age at marriage; the lapse of time between marriage and 
first-birth is on average 1.6 years. 
Marriage occurs early on in life. The average age at first marriage is 20.8 years among 
women aged 15-49. However, age at marriage and age at first-birth have been increasing and 
total fertility rate has been declining in Turkey (Figure 1). The DHS data indicate that age at 
marriage increased from 19.1 years in 1983 to 20.8 years in 2008 and the age at first-birth 
from 20.6 to 22.3 years over the same time period. Total fertility rate, on the other hand, 
declined from 4.10 children per woman to 2.15 children per woman over the 20-year period. 
Teenage marriage has become less common with the increasing age at marriage; however, it 
still remains at a quite significant level: 22.2 percent of 19-year-old women were married in 
2008, down from 30.3 percent in 1993. 
                                                
5 They find smaller effects for Norway.   9 
Prior to 2002, the Civil Code stipulated age 15 as the minimum age for marriage for 
women in Turkey.
6 In line with the more egalitarian spirit of the new Civil Code, the age at 
marriage was equated for men and women at age 17 in 2002.
7,8  However, women could still 
get married with religious ceremonies before reaching the minimum legal age. For instance, 
1.24 percent of all 14-year-old women were married in 1993, when the minimum legal age 
was 15. After the minimum age was raised to 17, 3.35 percent of 16-year-old women in 2003, 
3.84 percent of 16-year-old women in 2008 were married. 
Most people have both religious and civil marriages. However, the fraction of women 
who have religious marriages only is important. For instance, almost 8 percent of all 15- to 
49-year-old women had religious marriage only in 1993 and 1998. This share dropped to 6 
percent in 2003 and to 4 percent in 2008. Notwithstanding these changes, the fraction who 
have religious marriages only remains remarkably high among young women. The fraction of 
15- to 19-year-old married women who had only religious marriage was 33 percent in 1993. 
This fraction dropped only to 29 percent in 2008. 
Before  the  change  in  the  basic  education  law,  the  education  system  in  Turkey 
consisted of five years of primary, three years of lower secondary and three years of upper 
secondary schooling. Prior to 1997, only the first tier was compulsory. In 1997, the first two 
tiers  were  combined  so  that  compulsory  schooling  increased  from  five  to  eight  years. 
Improving the low attendance rates at lower secondary school level was a long established 
goal. However, the exact timing of the implementation of the new education policy had to do 
with the political developments of that time. The secular government that came to power in 
1997 wanted to prevent young children from enrolling in religious schools. Extension of 
compulsory schooling could at least delay this for three years. 
                                                
6 Under unusual circumstances such as pregnancy and with parental consent and court decree, 
a female child as young as 14 years could get married.  
7 Under unusual circumstances, a 16-year-old is allowed to get married.  
8 The Law went into effect on January 1
st, 2002.   10 
2.3. Effect of the New Compulsory Schooling Law on Educational Attainment 
In  order  to  examine  the  relevance  of  the  new  compulsory  schooling  policy  with 
schooling outcomes, we compare the school enrollment rates of 8- to 14-year-old girls before 
and after the change in policy using the four waves of DHS from 1993 to 2008. This is 
illustrated in Table 1. Here, we employ a simple difference-in-differences strategy in order to 
separate the impact of the education policy from a secular improvement in enrollment rates 
over time. 12- to 14-year-old girls are the ones who are the most likely to be attending grades 
6 to 8; therefore, they are the ones whose behavior is most likely to change by the policy. The 
enrollment rate of 12-year-old girls increased roughly by 5 percentage points between 1993 
and 1998, and by roughly 10 percentage points between 2003 and 2008; however, it increased 
by 27 percentage points between 1998 and 2003 – the time interval during which the policy 
became effective. Similarly, the enrollment rates of 13 and 14-year-old girls both increased 
by  roughly  30  percentage  points  between  1998  and  2003,  whereas  the  changes  in  the 
enrollment rates of girls at these ages were much more modest between 1993 and 1998 as 
well as  between  2003  and  2008.  It  is also  important, at  this  point,  to note  the  dramatic 
magnitude of the improvement in enrollment rates with the change in education policy. 
It could still be that there was something else, apart from the education policy, that 
occurred between 1998 and 2003 that increased the enrollment rates of all girls. However, if 
we compare the change in enrollment rates of girls aged 12-14 with the enrollment rates of 
younger girls, we see that the substantial increase in the enrollment rates between 1998 and 
2003 was limited to girls attending grades 6 to 8.  Even though there is an improvement in the 
enrollment rates of 8- to 10 year-old girls in 2003 who would not be affected by the policy, 
this improvement is not any different from the improvement from 2003 to 2008. In fact, the 
improvement from 2003 to 2008 is higher on average for 8- to 10-year-old girls. Therefore,   11 
we can assert that the change in compulsory schooling duration brought about a substantial 
increase in the school enrollment rates at ages targeted by the policy. 
3.  Identification Strategy 
We  use  the  variation  in  the  years  of  compulsory  schooling  across  different  birth 
cohorts to identify the causal impact of the new compulsory schooling policy on the timing of 
marriage  and  first-birth  decisions.  Since  the  extension  of  compulsory  school  was 
implemented at the beginning of the 1997-1998 school year, all students who completed 
grade four or lower grades at the end of the 1996-1997 school year (i.e., who started grade 
four or lower grades in September 1996) were bound by the new policy. In other words, 
compulsory  schooling  was  for  eight  years  for  all  students  who  started  the  first  grade  in 
September 1993 or later; but it was five years for those who started earlier. 
Even  though  not  all  children  start  school  at  the  same  age,  we  do  not  have  the 
information on school starting age of children in our data set. Therefore, we need to assume 
that all children start school at a certain age. To examine the school start-age, we calculated 
the percentage of children currently in school by age using the 1993, 1998, and 2003 waves 
of the DHS. In 1993 and 1998, the mode of school starting age is seven, whereas in 2003 
most children start school at age 6. Since our sample includes women of 1978-1998 birth 
cohorts, most of the women in our sample started school before 1998. Therefore, we chose to 
take the school starting age as seven. Since the new compulsory schooling system affected 
children who started school at or after September 1993, we assume that children who were 
born in 1986 or later were bound by the new policy. 
In order to identify the impact of the new compulsory schooling policy, we generate a 
policy dummy variable. Table 2 shows how the value of this policy variable varies over the 
birth-cohort and age values that are included in our sample. When the calendar years are in   12 
bold, the policy dummy variable takes the value of 1; otherwise, the policy variable is zero. 
For all birth cohorts after 1986, the policy variable is one at all ages. For the 1986 birth 
cohort, it is one after age 11 (calendar year 1997) because the policy was not expected before 
implementation. For all other birth cohorts, the policy variable is zero at all ages. In addition, 
a correction is made for children who dropped out of school before 1997 as these children 
would not be affected by the policy. For instance, the policy dummy variable is zero for 
children who dropped out at any school level before completing the fourth grade among the 
1986 birth-cohort, before completing the third grade among the 1987 birth-cohort and so 
forth. Therefore, the policy dummy is zero for a small fraction of 1986 to 1989 birth-cohorts. 
In order to account for the change in the Civil Code, we use a dummy variable for 15- and 
16-years-old girls after 2002. In Table 2, the cells for which the new Civil Code is in effect 
are underlined. 
Since different birth cohorts attend a certain grade level at different calendar years, it 
becomes  critical  to  disentangle  the  effects  of  calendar  years  on  education–like  a  steady 
improvement in enrollment rates over time–from the effect of the change in the compulsory 
schooling policy, which is implemented at a certain point in time. Our identification strategy 
purges the impacts of these two factors. We use the variation in the policy dummy variable 
across different birth cohorts in identifying the impact of year dummies. For instance, while 
the policy variable takes the value of one in 2003 for birth cohorts after 1986, it is zero in 
2003 for the rest of the birth cohorts as can be seen in Table 2. A similar issue arises in 
purging the impact of the policy variable from age effects. Here, the source of identification 
is  again  the  variation  across  birth-cohorts.  For  instance,  when  we  examine  15-year-old 
children in Table 2, we see that the policy dummy is one for birth cohorts after 1986 and zero 
otherwise. This separates the effect of the policy variable from the age effects. Of course, this 
identification strategy assumes that there are no age and calendar year interaction effects; i.e.   13 
the way marriage and fertility behavior change over time is not different across age groups. 
We also test this assumption using a second specification in which we include time trends 
that vary across ages. Note that in both specifications our identification strategy assumes that 
there is no direct impact of year-of-birth variable; i.e. at a given age and calendar year, all 
year-of-birth cohorts would display the same marriage and fertility behavior. 
If  the  timing  of  the  change  in  the  education  policy  were  correlated  with  some 
unobserved  characteristics  that also affect  marriage  and  fertility  decisions,  we  would  get 
biased  estimates.  For  instance,  if  the  policy  change  came  right  after  some  shock  that 
decreased school enrollment rates while increasing marriage and fertility, there would be a 
problem. In this sense, it is important to note that the timing of the policy had to do with the 
political  circumstances  in  1997.  As  explained  in  Section  2,  although  improving  the  low 
lower-secondary school enrollment rates had long been in discussion by policy-makers, the 
extension of compulsory schooling was implemented in 1997 because the secular government 
that had recently came to power saw the policy also as a way of preventing young children 
from  attending  religious  schools.  Nonetheless,  whether  the  timing  of  the  policy  was 
correlated with such unobserved characteristics is not testable.
9 
4.  Data and Estimation Method 
  The  data  we  employ  come  from  the  2008  round  of  the  Demographic and  Health 
Survey of Hacettepe University of Turkey, which is representative nationally. This survey 
includes detailed information on the timing of marriage, first and consequent births on ever- 
married women, as well as a rich set of individual and household-level characteristics for 
both single and married women. The DHS data include 13,988 women between the ages of 
10-49. Of these women, 57.2 percent (8,003) are reported to be either currently or previously 
                                                
9 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) review the “natural experiments” literature and discuss the 
assumptions typically made in such studies.   14 
married. However, detailed marriage and fertility information is available for 7,405 of these 
women, with whom private interviews could be carried out. The number of never-married 
women in the data is 5,985.  
Using this data, we construct retrospective event histories for marriage and first-birth. 
The event history starts at age 10 for marriage and at age 12 for first-birth in accordance with 
the  first  age  that  these  events  are  observed  in  the  data.  The  event  history  ends  when  a 
marriage and fertility takes place or the woman turns 30-years-old.
10 A woman could also 
exit the risk set before age 30 without a marriage/fertility decision if she is younger than 30 in 
2008. For some women, the duration is censored in the right because they do not marry/give 
birth until age 30 or until the last age they are observed in the sample (for those who are 
younger than 30 in 2008). 
When the data are restricted to 10- to 30-year-old women in the marriage analysis, we 
are left with 8,457 women, of whom 2,752 (32.5 percent) are ever-married. When the data are 
put into person-age format, there are 72,847 observations. In fertility analysis, where the 
sample is restricted to 12- to 30-year-old women, there are 7,607 women in the sample of 
whom  2,207  (29  percent)  have  given  birth.  In  the  person-age  format,  there  are  61,477 
observations. 
In the duration analysis, we use a logistic form for the hazard function given by 
β X t b X t
X t h
X t h
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where t denotes the waiting time concept–which is age –, X is the vector of covariates, h(t,X) 
is the discrete time hazard rate at time t given X,  β  denotes the set of parameters to be 
                                                
10 We chose age 30 as the upper cut-off point. In choosing this cut-off point, there is a trade-
off between keeping the sample more homogenous and keeping the number of person-age 
observations relatively high. With age 30 as the upper cut-off point, the proportion of person-
age observations for which the education policy binds is roughly one-half.   15 
estimated, b(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t, and  ) , ( X t Ω  denote the odds of event 
given X at time t. Then, 
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Therefore, the estimated parameters can be interpreted in terms of odds ratios. 
The  baseline  hazard  function  we  choose  is  non-parametric:  we  use  a  piece-wise 
constant  baseline  hazard  where  the  waiting  time  concept  is  age;  therefore,  we  have  age 
dummies for ages 10 to 30. We allow the impact of the education policy variable to vary 
according  to  the  baseline  hazard  in  order  to  see  any  differential  impact  of  the  policy  at 
different age values.
11 
The  covariates,  X,  include—in  addition  to  the  key  variables  of  interest:  dummy 
variables for the education and Civil Code policies—dummy variables for age as well as 
calendar  year,  controls  for  ethnicity  and  geographic  location  at  the  age  of  12.
12  In  the 
empirical  specification, we allow the effect  of the ethnicity variable to vary by age. We 
control for the location of residence by interacting the 12 NUTS-1 level region dummies with 
three types of location dummies (province center, sub-province, village). 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table  3  lists  the  number  of  non-missing  observations,  mean  values,  and  standard 
deviations for the variables in the marriage and fertility samples, separately. Education policy 
takes the value of 1 in 46 percent of the person-age observations in the marriage sample, and 
40 percent of them in the fertility sample. The percentage of person-age observations for 
which the dummy for the civil code policy takes the value of 1 is lower: 7.6 percent in the 
                                                
11 On the other hand, the impact of the civil code policy is restricted to be the same at ages 15 
and 16 because it is not possible to identify a differential impact. 
12 We define ethnicity based on mother’s mother tongue. We take three ethnic groups: ethnic 
Turks, ethnic Kurds, and ethnic Arabs. All other ethnic groups are grouped with ethnic Turks.   16 
marriage sample and 9.1 percent in the fertility sample. The mean age in the marriage sample 
is 15.1, which is much closer to the lower end in the range of 10 to 30 because women exit 
the  sample  as  they  age  due  to  marriage  or  right-censoring.  Roughly  17  percent  of  the 
observations in both samples are for ethnic Kurds, and slightly over 2 percent are for ethnic 
Arabs. In terms of type of location of residence, 45 percent of the observations are from 
province centers, 22.5 percent are from sub-provinces, and the rest from villages. The region 
with the largest share of observations is Đstanbul, which accounts for almost 15 percent of all 
observations. 
Table 4 reports Kaplan-Meier cumulative hazard rates for marriage and first-birth in 
our sample. The fraction of women who are married at quite young ages is non-negligible. 
This fraction becomes especially noticeable after age 15. At age 15, 4.1 percent of the women 
are already married. This increases to 7.9 percent at the age of 16. More than a quarter are 
married by age 19, and more than a half are married by age 23. Teenage fertility is also high. 
By age 16, 2.5 percent of the women have already given birth. This percentage increases to 
5.6 for 17-year-olds. More than 10 percent of the women in our sample have given birth by 
age 18, almost a quarter by age 20, and more than a half by age 24. 
5.  Results 
  This section presents the estimation results on the impact of the new education policy 
on the timing of marriage and first-birth. Robustness checks on these estimation results are 
also given in this section. In the last part of this section, we examine whether the effect of the 
new  education  policy  on  timing  of  first-birth  works  through  its  effect  on  the  timing  of 
marriage or its effect on the time to first-birth after a woman is married.   17 
5.1.  Impact of the New Education Policy on the Timing of Marriage and 
First-Birth 
5.1.1.  Impact of the New Education Policy on the Timing of Marriage 
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that there is evidence that the new education 
policy reduces the probability of marriage before age 16. (The statistical significance is at the 
five percent level.) Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of the policy is large. The new 
policy decreases the odds of marriage by 92 percent for 10-11-year-olds, by 63 percent for 
12-13-year-olds, by 49 percent for 14-year-olds, and by 56 percent for 15-year-olds. Table 5 
also shows that there is no evidence for an impact of the change in the civil code on the 
probability of marriage. 
To have a better sense of the magnitude of the change in the levels of marriage caused 
by the extension of compulsory schooling, we present in Table 6 how the cumulative hazard 
rates for marriage change at various ages as a result of the policy. Actual cumulative hazard 
rates are those that are computed from the data, also given in Table 4. Policy cumulative 
hazard rates are calculated by first computing the policy hazard rates at each age using the 
estimated policy variable coefficients in Table 5 and the actual hazard rates at each age
13, and 
then cumulating the estimated policy hazard rates at each age up to each age presented in 
Table 6. We also perform two tests to see the joint statistical significance of the coefficients 
in Table 5 up to the selected ages in Table 6. First, we calculate the ratio of the policy 
cumulative hazard rate to the actual cumulative hazard rate at the selected ages to see the 
percentage drop as a result of the policy, and estimate the 95 percent confidence interval 
                                                
13 Policy hazard rates at each age are calculated using the following equation, where 
p h (.) 
denotes the policy hazard rate, 
a h (.) denotes the actual hazard rate, and 
p
t β  the effect of the 
education policy at time t. 
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around this ratio to see whether or not this confidence interval lies below 1. Second, we test 
the equality of the actual cumulative hazard rate to the policy cumulative hazard rate. 
According to Table 6, there exists evidence, statistically significant at the five percent 
level, that the education policy reduces the probability of marriage by age 16. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the impact of the policy on the probability of marriage is quite substantial. The 
policy reduces the probability of marriage by age 15 from 4.12 percent to 1.85 percent, and 
the probability of marriage by age 16 from 7.85 percent to 4.36 percent. The probability of 
marriage by age 17 also shows a sizeable decline from 13.2 percent to 11.3 percent; however, 
this effect is not found to be significant at conventional levels. 
The  results  presented  in  Table  6  clearly  indicate  that  schooling  and  marriage  are 
incompatible events. The completion of compulsory schooling years for a girl who starts 
school at age 7 would take place at age 14 or 15, and the hazard rates until age 15 exhibit 
substantial drop as a result of the policy. However, if girls were delaying their marriage 
decision only because of the fact that schooling and marriage are incompatible events, we 
would expect the girls who would have married during the new compulsory years were the 
policy not implemented to marry as soon as they complete the new compulsory schooling 
years. As a result, an upsurge in the marriage hazard rates right after the end of compulsory 
schooling would take place. However, according to Table 6, at age 16–more than a year after 
most girls complete the new compulsory schooling years–the impact of longer schooling 
years on marriage is still observed. Therefore, we can assert that the effect of the extension of 
compulsory schooling extends beyond the delay it creates in exposure time.  
  Our results also indicate that, in contrast to the change in education policy, the change 
in  the  civil  code  that  barred  marriage  for  15-  and  16-year-olds  had  no  impact  on  the 
probability of marriage at these ages. This result is likely to stem from the fact that in the 
present study we consider both civil and religious marriages, whereas the civil code only   19 
affects the former. As noted in Section 2, a considerable fraction of marriages at early ages 
are through religious ceremonies. 
5.1.2.  Impact of the New Education Policy on the Timing of First-Birth 
  Table 7 displays the estimates on the impact of the change in education policy on the 
first-birth decisions. The odds of giving first-birth at ages 14 and 15 are substantially reduced 
as a result of the policy. (The statistical significance is at the five percent level at age 15 and 
at the 10 percent level at age 14.) Quantitatively, the odds of giving birth are 71 percent lower 
at age 14 and 72 percent lower at age 15 as a result of the education policy. These are quite 
dramatic changes. The odds are also reduced for 12-13-year-olds; however, this effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels due possibly to the small occurrence of the 
event at such young ages. When we examine the effects at ages that are beyond compulsory 
school years, we observe reduced hazard rates for first-birth at ages 16 and 17 as well, though 
the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
To see the joint statistical significance of the policy variables age by age and assess 
the duration for which the effects of the policy are observed, we calculate cumulative hazard 
rates. These are reported in Table 8, which shows how the actual cumulative hazard rates at 
selected ages change as a result of the policy using the estimated coefficients in Table 7. To 
test the statistical difference between the actual and policy cumulative hazard rates, the 95 
percent confidence interval around the ratio of policy to actual cumulative hazard rates as 
well as a test of the equality of actual and policy cumulative hazard rates are given.  
Table 8 shows that the effect of new education policy in reducing the probability of 
first birth is observed until age 17. The statistical significance level of the evidence that the 
probability of first birth is reduced as a result of the education policy is at the 1 percent level 
by age 16 and at the 5 percent level by age 17. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of the 
education policy is quite large: the predicted proportion of women giving birth to their first   20 
child by age 16 drops from 2.5 percent to 1.3 percent (48 percent fall) and by age 17 from 5.6 
percent to 3.6 (36 percent fall) percent with the implementation of the new policy. 
These findings are consistent with what we found earlier for the timing of marriage. 
As noted earlier, giving birth out-of-wedlock is an extremely rare event in Turkey. That the 
age at marriage has registered an increase due to the policy implies an increase for the age at 
first-birth  as  well  and  this  is  what  we  find.  In  this  sense,  the finding  that  the  statistical 
significance of the impact of the education policy on marriage persists until age 16 is also in 
line with the finding that the impact of the policy on first-birth persists until age 17. 
5.1.3.  Other Covariates 
At this point it is important to emphasize that the effects of education policy on the 
timing of marriage and fertility reported in Tables 5 and 7 are obtained after controlling for 
year and age effects. As shown earlier in Figure 1, a gradual increase in the age at marriage 
and first-birth has been occurring in Turkey, part of which probably results from a secular 
increase in the age of marriage and first-birth. In that case, ignoring the time effects would 
unduly exaggerate the effect of schooling on the timing of marriage. 
Our estimated year effects from the marriage and fertility regressions are displayed in 
Figure 2. While year effects are relatively constant before 2000 for marriage and before 2002 
for fertility, they exhibit a substantial downward effect afterwards. For instance, compared to 
the baseline years of 1988 to 1994, the odds of marriage are 40 percent lower in 2001, and 78 
percent lower in 2008. (The statistical significance is at the 1 percent level in both cases.) The 
odds of first-birth are 48 percent lower in 2008. (This is statistically significant at the five 
percent level.) This implies that our estimation strategy can account for the negative effect of 
the education policy on marriage and fertility decisions along with a negative secular time 
trend effect.   21 
Age effects in the marriage and fertility regressions are displayed in Figure 3, where 
the odds ratio at age 25 is normalized to 1. As expected, at early ages the odds of both 
marriage and fertility increase substantially by age. However, this comes to a halt in mid-
twenties.  In  both  marriage  and  fertility  decisions,  there  is  no  statistically  significant 
difference between the effect of age 25 and those of all ages between 23 and 30, except for 
age 30 in the fertility regression where the odds of fertility is lower. 
The childhood place of residence, in terms of region of the country and the size of the 
location of residence, also turns out to be quite important in the marriage and first-birth 
decisions  of  these  women.  Women  who  spend  their  childhood  in  provincial  centers  are 
generally  less  likely  to  marry  and  give  birth  at  any  age  in  comparison  to  women  from 
subprovinces and villages. Regional differences also exist in the probability of marriage and 
giving birth. Women who spend their childhood outside of Đstanbul tend to have a higher 
likelihood of marrying and giving birth at a given age.  
The risk of marrying at young ages is considerably higher among ethnic Kurdish and 
Arabic women in comparison to ethnic Turkish women. The odds are especially high among 
the ethnic Kurdish youth between the ages of 10-16. Ethnicity proves to be an important 
determinant of the timing of first-birth as well. Ethnic Kurdish women are considerably more 
likely to give birth to their first child before age 18 in comparison to ethnic Turkish women. 
The differences between the ethnic groups are especially dramatic at very young ages. Ethnic 
Arabic women are  also more likely  to give birth before age 18 in comparison to ethnic 
Turkish women, though up until age 15, the risks of the two groups are similar. 
Notwithstanding these findings, it is important to note that the effect of policy remains 
robust to the inclusion of other covariates (results now shown). This is not a surprising result 
given that the covariates included in the model are all orthogonal to the policy change.   22 
5.2.  Robustness Check 
  The key identification assumption of Section 5.1 is that there are no age and calendar 
year interaction effects. However, if marriage and fertility rates decline differentially across 
age groups over time, this assumption would be violated. Even though it is not possible to 
identify the impact of age and calendar year interactions along with the effects of the policy, 
it is possible to allow for a varying impact of time over age groups by incorporating time 
trends that vary by age along with age dummies and the education policy. 
  The effects of the education policy on the cumulative hazard rates for marriage at 
selected ages are shown in Table 9, which is obtained from a logit estimation that includes 
the interactions of age dummies with a time trend along with all the other variables in Table 5 
except for year dummies. (The results of this estimation are reported in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.)  Our  results  from  Section  5.1.1,  regarding  the  impact  of  the  extension  of 
compulsory  schooling  on  the  timing  of  marriage,  remain  robust.  There  is  evidence, 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, that the increased compulsory schooling years 
decrease the probability of marriage by age 16. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is also 
quite robust. The probability of marriage by age 15 falls by 54 percent–it was 55 percent in 
Section 5.1.1–and the probability of marriage by age 16 falls by 45 percent, which was 44 
percent in Section 5.1.1. 
  The results of our robustness check for time to first-birth are presented in Table 10, 
which presents the effects of the education policy on the cumulative hazard rates for first-
birth at selected ages. (The parameter estimates on which Table 10 is based on are given in 
Table A2 in the Appendix.) Our results regarding the impact of education policy on fertility 
behavior are also robust. There is strong evidence that the education policy decreases the 
probability of giving birth by age 17. In this case, however, there is also some evidence, 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, that the probability of giving birth by age 18 is   23 
reduced by the extension of compulsory schooling. The magnitudes of the effect of the policy 
are also very similar to our findings in Section 5.1.2. The  probability of giving first-birth is 
reduced by 52 percent at age 16, and by 41 percent at age 17. The corresponding reductions 
in Section 5.1.2. were 48 percent at age 16, and by 36 percent at age 17. 
5.3.  Impact of the New Eduction Policy on the Timing of First-Birth after 
Marriage 
  The fall in the fraction of women who give birth at young ages, illustrated in Section 
5.1.2, could arise from two different mechanisms. First, it could be brought about by a change 
in the age at marriage and, in fact, we illustrated in Section 5.1.1 that the fraction of women 
who  get  married  at  young  ages  also  went  down.  However,  there  is  another  mechanism 
through which the fraction of women who give birth at young ages could go down. As a 
result of the higher education levels, caused by the education policy, married women could be 
delaying  the  birth  of their first-child. In  this subsection, we tackle this question. Once a 
woman is married, does an increase in schooling reduce the probability of giving birth to the 
first-child? 
   In the duration analysis in this section, women enter the risk set once they are married. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 11. As can be seen from the table, none of the 
coefficients of the policy variable at any age is statistically significant. In other words, there 
is no evidence that once married, the new education policy affects the probability of first-
birth at any particular age. However, cumulative effects of the policy over consecutive ages–
similar to those presented in Tables 9 and 11–could be statistically significant. There is, 
though, a key difference here. In Tables 9 and 11, we started cumulating age effects at ages 
10 and 12, respectively, as all women entered the risk set at these ages. In this case, however, 
women enter the risk set at various ages because marriage takes place at different ages for 
different  women.  Therefore,  we  need  to  cumulate  the  coefficients  of  the  policy  variable   24 
starting  from  every  possible  age  in  Table  12.  For  instance,  the  coefficient  of  the  policy 
variable is negative at ages 15, 16, and 17; i.e., for a woman who is married at age 15, the 
odds  of  giving  her  first-birth  is  lower  for  three  consecutive  years.  However,  once  we 
cumulate the effect of these coefficients, using the methodology of Tables 9 and 11, it still 
remains statistically insignificant at conventional levels. In fact, whatever age a woman gets 
married, the cumulative effect of the policy variables in the following ages (for any number 
of consecutive years) is statistically insignificant. Therefore, we conclude that we find no 
evidence that the increased compulsory schooling years affect the timing of the first-birth 
once a woman is married. This result also implies that the source of the increased age at first-
birth that we noted earlier must be the delayed age-at-marriage.  
6.  Discussion 
Black et al. (2008) and Monstand et al. (2008) discuss two mechanisms through which 
education  affects  fertility.  The  first  one  is  the  incarceration  effect  according  to  which 
schooling as an activity reduces the probability of pregnancy. Incarceration effect ends as 
soon as children are out of school. The second one is the human capital investment effect, 
which reduces fertility in the long-term as well by changing the lifetime cost/benefit structure 
like market wages. 
  In the Turkish case, it is more appropriate to think about the incarceration and human 
capital effects on marriage rather than fertility because marriage is virtually a prerequisite for 
fertility in Turkey and the time from marriage to first-birth has stayed constant at a level of 
1.6 years for a long time. We find a very strong incarceration effect of schooling on marriage. 
The probability of marriage drops substantially during the ages girls are mandated to stay in 
school with the new education policy. At the same time, we also find that the effect of the 
new compulsory schooling policy on marriage persists until age 16, more than a year after   25 
most girls complete the new compulsory schooling years. In fact, the magnitude of the fall at 
age 17 is also relatively large; however, due to our relatively small sample size, we can not 
draw conclusions for this age. This suggests that human capital effects play a role as well. 
However,  Tunalı  and  Yüret  (2008)  report  some  spillover  effects  of  the  new  compulsory 
schooling  scheme  on  secondary  education  in  Turkey:  once  they  are  mandated  to  stay  in 
school until the end of grade 8, some children who would not complete grades 6 to 8 in the 
absence of the new policy continue to complete grades 9 and further. Therefore, it is harder to 
make  a  strong  argument  on  the  existence  of  human  capital  effect  in  Turkey  as  the 
incarceration effect may play a role even after compulsory schooling years. In addition, our 
finding that education has no effect on the time to first-birth after marriage also implies that 
there is no evidence of a human capital effect on the time until first-birth after marriage.  
  Black et al. (2008) find only weak evidence of incarceration effect but strong evidence 
of the human capital effect in the U.S. and Norway whereas it is just the opposite in our case. 
In Western societies, teenage fertility may not be necessarily planned, it may just happen due 
to  idiosyncratic  events.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Turkey,  it  is  clearly  planned  along  with 
marriage. Therefore, schooling puts a very strong break on teenage fertility in Turkey by 
preventing  marriage  whereas  it  causes  just  a  deceleration  in  the  U.S.  and  Norway  by 
decreasing the chances of pregnancy. 
  The finding for a weaker human capital effect in Turkey, compared to those in the 
U.S. and Norway, is likely to be driven from the different labor market conditions women 
face in Turkey. A higher level of education increases the opportunity cost of childbearing by 
increasing the market wage rate. This effect of a higher level of education, however, would 
be much weaker in Turkey compared to those in the U.S. and Norway. First of all, female 
labor force participation rate in Turkey is quite low, in particular for women with low levels 
of education. Therefore, higher wages, if any, do not mean much for the vast majority of   26 
women.  Obviously,  higher  wages  could  also  pull  the  participation  rates  up.  However, 
participation rates do not increase much with higher levels of education in Turkey (the only 
exception is college graduation). For instance, according to the 2006 Household Labor Force 
Survey, while the participation rate of women with five years of education in urban areas was 
13.3  percent,  it  was  only  slightly  higher  at  15.3  percent  for  women  with  eight  years  of 
education in urban areas. Therefore, young women in Turkey would be much less likely to 
delay fertility due to increased labor market opportunities with this particular extension of 
compulsory education.  
Our finding that the increased compulsory schooling years did not change the time to 
first-birth  after  marriage  means  that  the  time  to  first-birth  increased  because  the  time  to 
marriage increased as a result of the education policy. This stems from the fact that marriage 
and fertility can be seen as a rigid sequence of events in Turkey, in which the latter comes 
immediately after the former. Although, as mentioned earlier, age at marriage has increased 
and total fertility declined considerably over time, the lapse of time between age at marriage 
and first birth has not registered significant increases over time. The results derived from the 
1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008 DHS consistently show that the time from marriage to first-birth 
has remained stable over time at 1.6 years. This has taken place along with a steady level of 
childlessness, which is quite uncommon in Turkey–only 1 percent of ever married women are 
childless at the end of their reproductive period.  
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of the extension of compulsory schooling from 5 
to 8 years in Turkey on the marriage and fertility decisions of teenage women. We find that 
the rise in compulsory schooling years indeed reduces the probability of marriage and giving 
birth  for  these  women.  Moreover,  the  magnitude  of  this  effect  is  quite  substantial.  The   27 
proportion of married women at age 16 drops by 44 percent and the proportion of women 
who have given birth by age 17 falls by 36 percent as a result of the education policy. 
We find a very strong incarceration effect of the new compulsory schooling policy on 
marriage and, therefore, on the time until first-birth in Turkey. The probability of marriage by 
age is reduced at all ages until age 15, the ages girls are mandated to stay in school. At the 
same time, we do not observe a catch-up effect after girls complete compulsory schooling: 
the probability of marriage in the years after girls leave compulsory schooling, at ages 15 and 
16, does not increase. Moreover, the proability of being married at age 16—almost two years 
after the completion of compulsory schooling—is lower as a result of the new policy. This 
suggests that the impact of  the  new education policy on marriage works through  human 
capital accumulation as well. However, the evidence for this mechanism is weaker compared 
to the incarceration effect. 
The delaying effect of the new education policy on first-birth could be brought about 
by two different mechanisms: by delaying the timing of marriage or by increasing the time 
until  first-birth  after  marriage  (or  both).  We  find  that  the  negative  impact  of  the  new 
education policy on the probability of giving first-birth is driven from the negative impact of 
the new policy on the probability of marriage. There is no evidence that a higher level of 
education changes the time until first-birth once a woman is married. 
While we find a substantial impact of the new compulsory schooling policy on the 
time until marriage and first-birth for teenage women in Turkey, we find no evidence that the 
change in the Civil Code which raised the minimum age for marriage reduced the probability 
of  marriage  for  teenage  women  in  Turkey.  The  change  in  the  Civil  Code  was  mostly 
ineffective  because  girls  could  still  get  married  through  religious  marriages.  In  fact,  an 
important fraction of marriages at early ages are through religious ceremonies only. However,   28 
the  education  policy  was  successful  in  preventing  marriage–either  civil  or  religious–of 
teenage women.    29 
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Table 1: Enrollment Rates by Age over Time 
 
Year  Age 8  Age 9  Age 10  Age 11  Age 12  Age 13  Age 14 
1993  89.8  91.6  90.0  79.7  56.7  49.0  42.6 
1998  85.9  91.2  89.8  80.5  61.6  58.5  39.6 
2003  92.4  96.3  94.2  94.7  88.7  85.1  70.2 
2008  99.9  99.9  99.5  98.3  98.4  88.4  78.4 
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Table 2: Education Policy Dummy Variable According to Birth-Cohorts and Age 
 
Calendar Year  Birth 
Year  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  …  1988 
1998  10                             
1997  11  10                           
1996  12  11  10                         
1995  13  12  11  10                       
1994  14  13  12  11  10                     
1993  15  14  13  12  11  10                   
1992  16  15  14  13  12  11  10                 
1991  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10               
1990  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10             
1989  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10           
1988  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10         
1987  21  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10       
1986  22  21  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10     
1985  23  22  21  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  ….   
1984  24  23  22  21  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  ….   
…..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..  …..   
1978  30  29  28  27  26  25  24  23  22  21  20  19  18  …..  10 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
   Marriage Sample     Fertility Sample 
   # Obs  Mean  SD    # Obs  Mean  SD 
Education Policy  72847  0.458  0.499    61477  0.400  0.493 
Civil Code Policy  72847  0.076  0.271    61477  0.091  0.295 
Age  72847  15.142  4.039    61477  16.835  3.824 
Year  72847  2000.802  5.101    61477  2001.618  4.614 
Ethnicity               
Ethnic Kurdish  72183  0.171  0.424    61190  0.166  0.420 
Ethnic Arabic  72183  0.023  0.160    61190  0.022  0.161 
Type of Place of Residence at Age 12               
Province Center  72285  0.458  0.493    60975  0.451  0.492 
Sub-province  72285  0.224  0.423    60975  0.225  0.424 
Village  72285  0.318  0.476    60975  0.324  0.478 
Region of Residence at Age 12               
Istanbul  72247  0.148  0.243    60936  0.144  0.241 
West Marmara  72247  0.034  0.193    60936  0.034  0.194 
Aegean  72247  0.110  0.238    60936  0.109  0.239 
East Marmara  72247  0.077  0.230    60936  0.078  0.231 
West Anatolia  72247  0.089  0.258    60936  0.089  0.260 
Mediterranean  72247  0.122  0.340    60936  0.121  0.339 
Central Anatolia  72247  0.058  0.249    60936  0.059  0.252 
West Black Sea  72247  0.085  0.285    60936  0.088  0.287 
East Black Sea  72247  0.037  0.221    60936  0.038  0.222 
Northeast Anatolia  72247  0.036  0.278    60936  0.036  0.275 
Central East Anatolia  72247  0.075  0.318    60936  0.075  0.317 
Southeast Anatolia  72247  0.129  0.377     60936  0.127  0.375   
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Table 4: Cumulative Hazard Rates for Marriage and First-Birth 
 
Age at Marriage    Age at First Birth 
Age  Cumulative Hazard Rate     Age  Cumulative Hazard Rate 
10  0.0002       
11  0.0009       
12  0.0016    12  0.0003 
13  0.0057    13  0.0008 
14  0.0171    14  0.0035 
15  0.0412    15  0.0095 
16  0.0785    16  0.0249 
17  0.1324    17  0.0558 
18  0.2108    18  0.1013 
19  0.2853    19  0.1614 
20  0.3585    20  0.2417 
21  0.4305    21  0.3152 
22  0.4885    22  0.3831 
23  0.5521    23  0.4549 
24  0.6053    24  0.5122 
25  0.6619    25  0.5667 
26  0.7007    26  0.6211 
27  0.7314    27  0.6636 
28  0.7598    28  0.7025 
29  0.7780    29  0.7321 
30  0.7841     30  0.7394 
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Table 5 Logit Estimation Results of the Duration Model for time to Marriage 
  Coefficients  Odds ratios 
-2.571**  0.076  Policy*Ages 10-11  [1.051]   
-0.995**  0.369  Policy*Ages 12-13  [0.441]   
-0.672**  0.510  Policy*Age 14  [0.337]   
-0.826**  0.437  Policy*Age 15  [0.375]   
-0.434  0.647  Policy*Age 16  [0.357]   
0.229  1.257  Policy*Age 17  [0.175]   
-0.021  0.978  Policy*Age 18  [0.169]   
0.253  1.288  Policy*Age 19  [0.176]   
0.167  1.181  Policy*Age 20  [0.195]   
-0.168  0.845  Policy*Age 21  [0.263]   
-0.211  0.809  Policy*Age 22  [0.461]   
0.451  1.570  Change in civil code  [0.341]   
Number of subjects  8,457 
Number of failures  2,752 
Time at risk  71,556 
Wald Chi2 (119)  1563.89 
Prob>Chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R squared  0.1977 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Other control variables include dummies for interactions 
between  region  and  size  of  location  of  residence  until  age  12,  dummies  for  interactions 
between ethnicity and age, as well as calendar year and age dummies.   38 
 
Table 6 Effects of the Policy on the Cumulative Hazard Rates for Marriage 
  Age=15  Age=16  Age=17 
Cumulative Hazard Rate       
Actual  0.0412  0.0785  0.1324 
Policy  0.0185  0.0436  0.1129 
       
Ratio (Policy/Actual)  0.4496  0.5553  0.8528 
95% Confidence Interval       
Lower Bound  0.2310  0.2521  0.6105 
Upper Bound  0.6682  0.8584  1.0950 
       
Test: Actual=Policy       
Chi2  24.34  8.26  1.42 
Prob>Chi2  0.0000  0.0040  0.2338   39 
Table 7 Logit Estimation Results of the Duration Model for time to First-Birth 
  Coefficients  Odds Ratios 
-1.702  0.182  Policy*Ages 12-13  [1.099]   
-1.244*  0.288  Policy*Age 14  [0.661]   
-1.284**  0.276  Policy*Age 15  [0.631]   
-0.420  0.656  Policy*Age 16  [0.317]   
-0.312  0.732  Policy*Age 17  [0.218]   
0.087  1.091  Policy*Age 18  [0.214]   
-0.134  0.874  Policy*Age 19  [0.191]   
-0.005  0.995  Policy*Age 20  [0.194]   
0.009  1.010  Policy*Age 21  [0.227]   
.234  1.263  Policy*Age 22  [0.297]   
Number of subjects  7,607 
Number of failures  2,247 
Time at risk  60,626 
Wald Chi2 (119)  1217.25 
Prob>Chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R squared  0.1892 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Other control variables include dummies for interactions 
between  region  and  size  of  location  of  residence  until  age  12,  dummies  for  interactions 
between ethnicity and age, as well as calendar year and age dummies. 
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Table 8 Effects of the Policy on the Cumulative Hazard Rate for First Birth 
  Age=16  Age=17  Age=18 
Cumulative Hazard Rate       
Actual  0.0249  0.0558  0.1013 
Policy  0.0128  0.0359  0.0864 
       
Ratio (Policy/Actual)  0.5154  0.6439  0.8533 
95% Confidence Interval       
Lower Bound  0.2390  0.4213  0.6064 
Upper Bound  0.7919  0.8666  1.1003 
       
Test: Actual=Policy       
Chi2  11.80  9.82  1.35 
Prob>Chi2  0.0006  0.0017  0.2445   41 
Table 9 Effects of the Policy on the Cumulative Hazard Rates for Marriage (Time 
Trends Included) 
 
  Age=15  Age=16  Age=17 
Cumulative Hazard Rate       
Baseline  0.0412  0.0785  0.1324 
Policy  0.0191  0.0430  0.1057 
       
Ratio (Policy/Baseline)  0.4628  0.5483  0.7985 
95% Confidence Interval       
Lower Bound  0.1674  0.2436  0.5063 
Upper Bound  0.7582  0.8530  1.0908 
       
Test: Baseline=Policy       
Chi2  12.70  8.44  1.82 
Prob>Chi2  0.0004  0.0037  0.1767 
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Table 10 Effects of the Policy on the Cumulative Hazard Rate for First-Birth (Time 
Trends Included) 
 
  Age=16  Age=17  Age=18 
Cumulative Hazard Rate       
Baseline  0.0249  0.0558  0.1013 
Policy  0.0120  0.0329  0.0754 
       
Ratio (Policy/Baseline)  0.4821  0.5903  0.7442 
95% Confidence Interval       
Lower Bound  0.0878  0.2785  0.4511 
Upper Bound  0.8764  0.9021  1.0373 
       
Test: Baseline=Policy       
Chi2  6.63  6.63  2.92 
Prob>Chi2  0.0100  0.0100  0.0872 
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Table 11 Logit Estimation Results of the Duration Model for time to First Birth After 
Marriage 
  Coefficients  Odds ratio 
0.111  1.117  Policy*Ages 12-13  [1.248]   
0.124  1.133  Policy*Age 14  [0.700]   
-0.504  0.604  Policy*Age 15  [0.673]   
-0.132  0.876  Policy*Age 16  [0.344]   
-0.277  0.758  Policy*Age 17  [0.241]   
0.148  1.159  Policy*Age 18  [0.233]   
-0.236  0.789  Policy*Age 19  [0.213]   
-0.163  0.849  Policy*Age 20  [0.221]   
0.096  1.099  Policy*Age 21  [0.266]   
.302  1.352  Policy*Age 22  [0.352]   
Number of subjects  2,698 
Number of failures  2,219 
Time at risk  7,876 
Wald Chi2 (119)  338.82 
Prob>Chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R squared  0.0350 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Other covariates include ethnicity dummies and their 
interactions with age, dummies for childhood place of residence and its size as well as their 
interactions, calendar year and age dummies.        44 
 
Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate, Mean Age at First Marriage, and Mean Age at First 
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Table A1 Logit Estimation Results of the Duration Model for time to Marriage  
with Time Trends 
 
  Coefficients  Odds ratios 
-0.937  0.392  Policy*Ages 10-11 
[1.685]   
-0.251  0.778  Policy*Ages 12-13  [0.929]   
-0.733  0.480  Policy*Age 14  [0.537]   
-0.958**  0.384  Policy*Age 15  [0.455]   
-0.479  0.619  Policy*Age 16  [0.401]   
0.121  1.128  Policy*Age 17  [0.278]   
-0.222  0.801  Policy*Age 18  [0.255]   
0.349  1.418  Policy*Age 19  [0.236]   
0.164  1.178  Policy*Age 20  [0.253]   
-0.542*  0.581  Policy*Age 21  [0.304]   
-1.209**  0.298  Policy*Age 22  [0.474]   
0.451  1.711  Change in civil code  [0.341]   
Number of subjects  8,194 
Number of failures  2,752 
Time at risk  71,556 
Wald Chi2 (119)  1518.92 
Prob>Chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R squared  0.1947 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Other control variables include dummies for interactions 
between  region  and  size  of  location  of  residence  until  age  12,  dummies  for  interactions 
between ethnicity and age, as well as age dummies and their interactions with a time trend.
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Table A2 Logit Estimation Results of the Duration Model for time to First Birth 
with Time Trends 
 
  Coefficients  Odds Ratios 
0.090  0.182  Policy*Ages 12-13 
[1.535]   
-2.083**  0.288  Policy*Age 14  [0.966]   
-1.473  0.276  Policy*Age 15  [0.959]   
-0.506  0.656  Policy*Age 16  [0.497]   
-0.414  0.732  Policy*Age 17  [0.362]   
-0.098  1.091  Policy*Age 18  [0.308]   
-0.282  0.874  Policy*Age 19  [0.263]   
-0.229  0.995  Policy*Age 20  [0.240]   
0.094  1.010  Policy*Age 21  [0.281]   
.084  1.263  Policy*Age 22  [0.330]   
Number of subjects  7,417 
Number of failures  2,247 
Time at risk  60,626 
Wald Chi2 (113)  1332.43 
Prob>Chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R squared  0.1898 
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance 
at 5%; and *** significance at 1%. Other control variables include dummies for interactions 
between  region  and  size  of  location  of  residence  until  age  12,  dummies  for  interactions 
between ethnicity and age, as well as age dummies and their interactions with a time trend.
     
 